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Abstract
Money holding behavior at low interest rates is central for evaluating the
welfare costs of low inﬂation. We study this issue by focusing on Italian
households’ demand for currency using a unique panel of micro data that
span the 1989-2002 period. The more recent data are extracted from a low
inﬂation sample which oﬀers the possibility to analyze money demand at
low interest rates. The results provide information on the “optimal rate of
inﬂation” and oﬀer insights on the properties that should be featured by a
data-consistent model of currency holding behavior. A simple modiﬁcation
of the standard currency “inventory” model is proposed which allows us to
explain several aspects of the data and to provide an assessment of the welfare
costs of inﬂation.
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Reducing inﬂation has been the priority of most central banks during the past 25
years. But while a broad consensus emerged about the “price stability” goal, quan-
tiﬁcation of this objective remains controversial. This is partly due to the fact that
the costs of (“low”) inﬂation are diﬃcult to measure.
Monetary theory oﬀers a measure of the inﬂation costs. In a monetary economy
inﬂation requires individuals to spend resources to economize on cash balances.
Reducing inﬂation diminishes the resources that each citizen dedicates to such an
unproductive activity, and therefore increases welfare. This simple and powerful
insight, made explicit by the seminal contributions of Bailey (1956) and Friedman
(1969), is still the core of the theory on the costs of inﬂation.
Measuring the welfare costs of inﬂation in accordance to this view requires infor-
mation on the interest elasticity of money demand, to gauge the magnitude of the
distortion induced upon the holdings of non-interest bearing assets by a greater rate
of inﬂation. Following this line of reasoning Lucas (2000) estimates that the welfare
gain of reducing inﬂation from about 14 to 3 per cent is comparable to a permanent
increase of one per cent of GDP. Moreover, he shows that while this quantiﬁcation
is relatively robust to the money demand speciﬁcation adopted to ﬁt the historical
data, the welfare gain delivered by a further inﬂation reduction crucially hinges on
the interest elasticity of money demand at low interest rates. Depending on the
money demand speciﬁcation, the gain of reducing inﬂation from 3 per cent to zero
ranges from about 1 per cent of GDP to basically nil. As Lucas put it “money
holding behavior at low interest rates is central for estimating welfare costs”. From
a policy perspective, the point is key to gauge whether the current low inﬂation
rates allow citizens to get rid of the bulk of inﬂation costs or whether an additional
inﬂation reduction would yield more beneﬁts. This paper attempts to provide an
answer.
There are two main empirical diﬃculties, though, in answering this important
question. The ﬁrst one is that, as shown by Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002),
diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnancial sophistication across households may bias the inference
on money-holdings behavior drawn from aggregate data. This problem requires
using micro data, which are not generally available. The second is that most ob-
servations available until recently, whether macro or micro, were not drawn from a
“low interest rate” sample.
This paper tackles both problems. We use data on currency management at
the household level drawn from a unique survey of Italian households conducted
by the Bank of Italy approximately every two years between 1989 and 2002. The
more recent data include a large number of observations drawn from a low-inﬂation
period; these oﬀer a great natural laboratory to understand money demand at low
interest rates.
The next section describes the database and portrays the main developments
in the ﬁnancial variables of interest over the past 15 years. Estimates of a simple
inventory-theoretic model of the demand for currency, following Attanasio et al.
1(2002), are presented in Section 3. Several results suggest the inadequacy of the
basic inventory theoretic model in explaining the data. Section 4 proposes a simple
modiﬁcation of that model which allows us to interpret our results and discuss the
welfare costs of inﬂation. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Currency and ﬁnancial innovation in the last 15
years: data sources and descriptive statistics
2.1 Sources
The main source of the data is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
This is a periodic survey conducted by the Bank of Italy since 19651 on a rotating
sample of Italian households that includes on top of individual characteristics of the
components of the household, information on employment and income, on wealth
and on consumption and saving behaviors. We focus here on the surveys from 1989
to 2002 because they include a section that is speciﬁcally related to households’
use of forms of payment and on cash management. In particular, the ﬁrst part
of this section is focused on the payment technologies available to the household
(from bank transfers to periodical payments, from the use of bank checks to that of
debit cards), on the number and characteristics of bank accounts (e.g. interest rate
received on deposits or the possibility of overdraft) and on the use of ATM and/or
credit card. The second part is centered on currency management and includes
information on the average monthly number of withdrawals (both through ATM
cards and directly from the bank desk) and deposits, to the average amount of
cash held by the household, the minimum level of currency holdings that triggers a
withdrawal, the amount of consumption expenditures that is done in cash.
Each survey is conducted on a sample of about 8000 households. Samples
are not representative, however sampling weights that allow to bring some socio-
demographic marginal distributions into line with the corresponding distributions
found in Istat population statistics and labor force survey are available.2 The use of
micro data from surveys like the one used in this work poses two important types of
problems. The ﬁrst one is related to intertemporal data comparability that may be
aﬀected by changes in the structure of the questions, the second one to well known
problems of misreporting. As far as the ﬁrst problem is concerned, in spite of many
changes that have aﬀected SHIW, most of the questions related to the data used in
this paper are virtually unchanged. In addition in the few cases where the deﬁnition
of variables changed over time, proper transformations have been applied to guar-
antee intertemporal comparability.3 With respect to the second type of problems,
1The frequency of the survey has been annual from 1965 to 1987 and bi-annual since 1989. The
only two exception are the fact that it was not conducted in 1985 and that there was a two year
interruption from 1995 to 1998.
2Such weights have been used to compute the statistics presented in table 1.
3See description of the historical database for details.
2available studies4 suggest that they mainly aﬀect data on ﬁnancial wealth and, to a
lesser degree, on real wealth and income; the data used in this work should be only
marginally inﬂuenced by voluntary misreporting problems.
Other two sources of data are the Italian Central Credit Register and the Su-
pervisory Reports to the Bank of Italy. The former source5 includes information on
the interest rate paid by banks on checking and saving accounts disaggregated by
year and province. The latter is constituted by reports that banks operating on the
Italian territory are required to send periodically to the Bank of Italy and include
information on balance sheet and income statements, as well as data on ﬁnancial in-
termediation and on the diﬀusion of diﬀerent forms of payment. From this source we
have obtained data on the number of ATM points and POS machines disaggregated
at provincial level.
2.2 A ﬁrst look at the data
The data obtained from the three sources described in the previous section has been
merged in a single database. It includes 55643 observations over the sample period
1989 - 2002. All variables reported in Table 1 are expressed in euros of 2002. The ﬁg-
ures summarize the main information about households’ currency management and
other ﬁnancial variables that are expected to impinge on the demand for currency.
The ﬁrst line of the table shows that about 15 per cent of the households do not
hold a bank (nor a postal) account. This fraction does not vary much from 1989 to
2002. During the same period a steady growth of ATM card possession is recorded;
the fraction of households increases from 15 per cent in 1989 to 55 per cent in 2002.
This diﬀusion is accompanied by a marked increase in the number of ATM points,
bank branches and POS machines (as a proportion of population).
Looking at currency, the average amount held by the household (measured in
real terms) has almost halved during the past 15 years. The reduction, which is
common across households with diﬀerent payment technologies, is largest for those
who owns an ATM card. The diﬀusion of new payment technologies is a likely cause
of the increasing number of ATM withdrawals during the nineties.6 The average size
of the ATM withdrawal decreased over the past 15 years. Note, moreover, that the
average withdrawal at an ATM is substantially smaller than the typical withdrawal
at a bank desk.
Finally notice that the fact that the minimum amount of currency is substantially
larger than zero (and greater for agents without the ATM), suggesting that a pre-
cautionary motive may play a relevant role in cash holding decisions. A satisfactory
model of the demand for currency should integrate this feature.
4See for example Battipaglia and D’Alessio (1997).
5A detailed description of this database is contained in Miller (2000).
6Data for 1991 are not directly comparable with those of the following years since in that year
the question on the average number of trips to a bank and to an ATM did not allow for annual
frequencies. This is likely to have induced an upward bias in the estimates of the average number
of trips and a downward bias in the estimates of the average withdrawal.
3Table 1: Currency and Financial Innovation
Variable 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002
Fraction with a bank account 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.85
Fraction using ATMs 0.15 0.29 0.34 0.40 0.49 0.52 0.55
Bank branchesa ... 341 384 421 470 501 532
ATM pointsa ... 221 315 393 505 570 649
POS machinesa ... 907 1,547 2,939 6,490 11,218 14,928
Household Holdings of Currency 672 554 396 445 388 374 376
No bank account 660 582 359 441 376 396 494
With bank account 674 549 403 445 390 370 355
No ATM card 665 572 426 482 423 427 405
With ATM card 719 505 368 403 364 335 329
Average withdrawal at a bank ... 487 655 554 520 488 482
No ATM card ... 478 660 547 515 505 484
With ATM card ... 511 645 563 526 474 481
Average withdrawal at an ATM ... 259 243 235 231 232 217
Total number of tripsb ... 29.0 27.4 30.3 41.9 44.4 43.0
To the bank (no ATM card) ... 18.4 12.5 13.1 19.9 16.6 17.5
To the bank (with ATM card) ... 14.9 12.7 10.7 11.9 13.0 10.5
To the ATM ... 35.5 36.7 39.2 46.8 48.9 46.2
Minimum currency 157 133 141 108 133 137 123
No ATM card 151 131 147 112 157 154 143
With ATM card 184 137 133 103 115 126 113
Nondurable consumptionb 19,737 19,234 18,563 18,547 17,594 18,214 18,635
Total number of observations 8,262 8,135 7,979 8,134 7,122 8,001 8,010
Note: Averages are computed using sample weights. - Data are deﬂated (base: 2002) and
expressed in euro. - Variables’ deﬁnitions are available in the appendix. - a Per million
residents in 1995. - b Per year.
Table 2 reports summary statistics on two measures of the interest rates paid on
deposits. The ﬁrst one is obtained from the “Central Credit Register” and is based
on interest rates disaggregated by year and province.7 The second measure, labeled
“Individual”, is obtained from a speciﬁc question available in SHIW since 1995.8
Two remarks are due. First, interest rates paid on deposits record a substantial
reduction since 1989. The decline is particularly signiﬁcant in the second half of
the nineties. Second, the cross-sectional distribution of the interest rate maintains
a relatively large coeﬃcient of variation even in the more recent years when the
average interest rate is very low. This is an extremely important feature of the data
because variability in interest rates is key for the inference on the interest elasticity
of money demand.
7Italian provinces were 95 until 1995 and became 103 afterwards.
8In particular households were asked to report the gross interest rate earned on deposits. In-
formation on individual interest rates is available only for a small subset of our sample. Note also
that the smaller sample is likely to be the main reason for the diﬀerences in the temporal trend of
the diﬀerent measures of interest rate.
4Table 2: Interest rates and inﬂation
Variable 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002
Interest rate (CCR)a 6.96 6.74 6.10 5.23 2.15 1.16 0.77
(0.49) (0.52) (0.42) (0.32) (0.23) (0.22) (0.15)
Interest rate (Individual) ... ... ... 5.47 2.09 2.07 1.60
... ... ...
(1.56) (1.59) (1.50) (1.31)
CPI deﬂatorb 0.62 0.70 0.77 0.84 0.91 0.95 1.00
Inﬂationb 6.3 6.3 4.6 5.2 2.0 2.5 2.5
Expected inﬂation current yearc 6.5 6.4 5.0 5.0 1.9 2.3 2.2
Expected inﬂation next yearc 5.8 5.7 4.6 4.4 1.9 1.9 2.0
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. - a Computed as simple mean of individual interest
rates disaggregated by province and year. - b Consumer price index. All items. - c Source:
Consensus Forecast.
3 The demand for currency: econometric speciﬁ-
cation and estimation
The descriptive evidence oﬀered in the previous section highlights that currency
holding behavior is highly heterogeneous across the population of Italian households,
especially concerning the households’ payment technology.9 As argued by Attanasio
et al. (2002) (AGJ henceforth) accounting for this heterogeneity, e.g. by controlling
for the household payment technology and the possibility of endogenous sample
selection, is important to obtain precise measures of the interest elasticity.
Following their lead we present estimates of the demand for currency that inte-
grate their sample, which ended in 1995, with the data made available by the three
following surveys (1998, 2000, 2002). As Table 2 shows, the very low interest rates
that characterize the more recent data seem appropriate to understand currency de-
mand in a low inﬂation environment.10 Let us now turn, therefore, to the estimation
of the demand for currency.
As in AGJ, the baseline speciﬁcation of the demand for currency is derived from
the McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) extension of the Baumol-Tobin inventory
model. The consumer chooses currency balance, m; to minimize the sum of the
cost of transaction time ¿w (the product of transaction time ¿ and the time of cost
transaction w) and foregone interest rates Rm, subject to a transaction technology:
min
¿;m
¿w + Rm (1)





9Moreover, while part of this heterogeneity has been reduced, e.g. by the increasing diﬀusion
of ATM cards and POS, other important diﬀerences persist (e.g. the percentage of households
without a bank account is roughly constant).
10As noted above, it is important for the estimation that notwithstanding the reduction of the
average rate, the cross-sectional variance of the interest rate paid on deposits remains high.
5where A measures technology improvements and c is consumption. The internal
solution of the minimization problem in (1) implies that the average holdings of real























We begin the analysis by assuming that the parameters of equation (3) are com-
mon among individuals who possess at least a bank or postal account. This choice
overlooks diﬀerences that can arise from the payment technology available to house-
holds (e.g. the ATM), but provides us with a large number of observations (about
47,000). Further sample splits to control for the the eﬀect of diﬀerent payment tech-
nologies are considered below. Moreover, we assume that log wi;tAi;t depends only
on calendar time. This is necessary to capture the time-series developments that
inﬂuence the “cost of time”. The main results are reported in the following table,
where three speciﬁcations for this evolution are considered (quadratic trend, linear
trend and year-dummies) .
Table 3: The Demand for Currency (agents with bank or postal account)
89-02 89-95 98-02 89-02 89-95 98-02 89-02 89-95 98-02
logRCCR
i;t 0.025 -0.134 0.043 -0.176 -0.378 0.052 -0.002 -0.159 0.043
(0.021) (0.061) (0.033) (0.012) (0.056) (0.032) (0.028) (0.060) (0.033)
logci;t 0.299 0.353 0.221 0.302 0.356 0.221 0.297 0.352 0.221
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
Trend -0.112 -0.178 -0.078 -0.082 -0.094 -0.004 ... ... ...
(0.003) (0.009) (0.079) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) ... ... ...
Trend2 0.004 0.012 0.003 ... ... ... ... ... ...
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) ... ... ... ... ... ...
Constant 3.400 3.260 3.957 3.709 3.590 3.509 3.355 3.125 3.447
(0.080) (0.142) (0.499) (0.075) (0.139) (0.157) (0.086) (0.141) (0.114)
R2 0.123 0.113 0.019 0.121 0.109 0.019 0.130 0.123 0.019
Total obs. 46,978 27,277 19,701 46,978 27,277 19,701 46,978 27,277 19,701
Year no no no no no no yes yes yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. - The dependent variable in the regression is the
logarithm of real currency. - Sample periods at the top of the columns. - Samples are
restricted to individual with a bank and/or postal account.
The ﬁrst column reports the full sample estimates for equation (3), using the
quadratic trend speciﬁcation of AGJ. The magnitude of the consumption elasticity
of the demand for currency is comparable to that found by AGJ. But the interest
elasticity is much smaller than the one detected by AGJ and statistically not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This ﬁnding suggests that the interest elasticity of
6the demand for currency is not stable over the whole sample. The regressions in
columns 2 and 3 explore this hypothesis. The second column of Table 3 estimates
the equation using the AGJ sample. A negative and signiﬁcant interest elasticity
emerges, as found by AGJ. But the regression over the more recent sample indicates
a coeﬃcient that is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (third column). In contrast,
the consumption elasticity is positive and highly signiﬁcant in both subsamples,
even though it is greater over the ﬁrst part of the sample. This could be due to
improvements in payment technology (more on this later on). The two alternative
speciﬁcations for the opportunity cost of time considered (analyzed respectively in
columns 4-6 and 7-9) conﬁrm these ﬁndings. The interest elasticity of the demand
for currency appears clearly over the ﬁrst part of the sample (until 1995) but the
estimates over the more recent sample (1998-02) detect a coeﬃcient that is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The instability of the interest elasticity is robust to more precise estimation
of the demand for currency. In particular, OLS estimates of equation (3) could
be subject to a “sample selection problem”. In essence, the problem arises from
the fact that the sample used for the estimation of equation (3) is not randomly
selected: the choice of opening a bank account or to have an ATM card is likely
to be aﬀected by unobserved individual characteristics that also inﬂuence money
demand. In this case parameters’ estimates obtained through OLS are biased and
inconsistent. A procedure developed by Heckman (1979) (the so called “Heckit”
estimator) allows us to control for this problem. The methodology consists of two
steps. First a probit is estimated over the full sample (including both individual
with a bank account (uncensored observations) and those without a bank account
(censored observations)) to obtain a measure (the “inverse Mills ratio”) of these
unobserved characteristics. In a second moment the inclusion of this measure as
an auxiliary variable in the baseline OLS regression (that is run on uncensored
observations) allows us to correct for the eﬀects of unobserved characteristics and
to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of the money demand equation.
The “Heckit” estimates for households who own an ATM card are presented in
Table 4.11 We focus on this group because the results of AGJ show that the interest
elasticity is much greater among these “ﬁnancially sophisticated” agents than in the
rest of the population. Our main question, based on the results of Table 3, concerns
whether the value of this elasticity shows any instability in the low-interest rate
period (1998-2002) compared to the previous sample (1989-1995).
Indeed, Table 4 highlights a dramatic change in the interest elasticity of the
demand for currency. A large, negative and statistically signiﬁcant interest elasticity
(-0.480) is detected over the 1989-1995 sample; the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is
close to the one detected by AGJ over the same sample using a slightly diﬀerent
speciﬁcation (equal to -0.59). The same coeﬃcient becomes statistically insigniﬁcant
and falls by one order of magnitude (to -0.058) when the equation is estimated over
the 1998-2002 sample. No apparent instability emerges about the consumption
elasticity of the currency demand. The “Mills ratio” is highly signiﬁcant, indicating
11The results are not sensitive to the choice of the linear trend speciﬁcation.











Inverse Mills Ratio 0.184 0.221
(0.026) (0.028)
Total obs. 31,457 22,990
Uncensored obs. 9,360 12,150
Note: The equation is estimated using Heckman’s two-stage procedure. - The dependent
variable in the probit regression for the households with ATM (Account) equals one if the
household has an ATM card (Bank or postal account), zero otherwise. The probit regressors
also include dummies for education (4 levels), gender and area of residence (city center, semi
center, outskirts), as well as a measure of ﬁnancial wealth and POS and ATM per capita
in province. - The dependent variable in the currency equation is the logarithm of real
currency.
that the selection problem is important.12
As a further check, Table 5 attempts to improve the measurement of the “shop-
ping time technology” and the opportunity cost of money, which inﬂuence the de-
mand for currency (through their impact on the variable wi;tAi;t). As to the former,
we utilize the information on the number of ATM and POS machines, measured at
the provincial level (in per capita terms). The idea is that the diﬀusion of these in-
struments reduces the time that is necessary to make a certain amount of purchases
(for instance because the distance from the nearest withdrawal point diminishes)
and/or the cash amount of currency that is necessary to buy a given amount of
goods (as purchases can be debited through the POS machine). Both eﬀects tend
to reduce Ai;t, the expected sign is therefore negative. We also include a variable to
control for the eﬀects of criminality rate (measured at the provincial level), which
is presumed to increase the opportunity cost of currency (a negative sign is thus
expected). Given the premises of this speciﬁcation, estimation is applied only to the
households who own an ATM.
This regression conﬁrms the ﬁnding that the estimated interest rate elasticity
is large and statistically signiﬁcant in the 1989-95 sample and becomes small and
insigniﬁcant afterwards. The estimated parameters for the eﬀect of ATM diﬀusion,
12The same qualitative ﬁndings emerge if the equation is estimated over the larger sample that
contains the households with (at least one) bank or postal account, regardless of whether they
possess an ATM.







ATM diﬀusiona -0.505 -0.672
(0.084) (0.050)








Mills Ratio -0.030 -0.016
(0.030) (0.029)
Total obs. 31,457 22,990
Uncensored obs. 9,360 12,150
Note: The equation is estimated using Heckman’s two-stage procedure. - The dependent
variable in the probit regression equals one if the household has an ATM card, zero otherwise.
- The probit regressors also include dummies for education (4 levels), gender and area of
residence (city center, semi center, outskirts), as well as a measure of ﬁnancial wealth and
POS and ATM per capita in province. - The dependent variable in the currency equation
is the logarithm of real currency. - a Number of machines per million residents.
POS and the crime variables on cash holdings are signiﬁcant in both samples and
display the expected signs.
Finally, we check the robustness of the previous ﬁndings using the households’
self-reported information on the interest rate earned on deposits, is available for a
small subsample of households since 1995 (see Section 2). This seriously limits the
number of observations and, moreover, it excludes high-interest rate years from the
sample (the only one left being 1995). The estimates, for the households with an
ATM, are reported in Table 6. We present results for three diﬀerent samples, pairing-
up consecutive surveys. The estimates detect a reduction in the interest elasticity
of the demand for currency. A small but highly signiﬁcant elasticity is detected over
the 1995-1998 period, approximately of around -0.1. This value decreases tenfold,
to 0.01, over the 2000-02 sample and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant. Diﬀerently
from the previous results, the estimated consumption elasticity appears decreasing
with time.
9Table 6: The Demand for Currency (ATM group) - “Individual” interest rate
1995-98 1998-00 2000-02
logRIND
i;t -0.078 -0.038 0.009
(0.027) (0.019) (0.021)
logci;t 0.559 0.470 0.318
(0.052) (0.045) (0.048)
ATM diﬀusiona -0.315 -0.659 -0.916
(0.116) (0.091) (0.105)
POS diﬀusiona -0.018 0.004 0.010
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Crime -0.025 -0.042 -0.032
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
Constant -0.018 -0.005 0.007
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Trend 0.312 1.214 2.769
(0.614) (0.519) (0.556)
Mills Ratio 0.707 0.464 0.107
(0.104) (0.092) (0.095)
Total obs. 4,433 5,614 3,700
Uncensored obs. 3,116 4,108 2,765
a See notes in Table 5.
4 Interpreting the data
This section presents a model to interpret the changes in interest elasticity detected
over the sample period and discuss its implications for the “shoe leather costs” of
inﬂation. We depart from the McCallum and Goodfriend inventory model, which
implies a constant interest rate elasticity of the demand for currency. Other aspects
of the model, moreover, are at odds with our data. In particular, the average
balance before withdrawal is much larger than zero, which suggests a “precautionary
component” in the demand for currency that cannot be generated by a deterministic
model.
The key feature of the proposed model is to relax the assumption of the inventory
model of Section 3 that all cash withdrawals are costly, and to explicitly account for
the fact that, in a modern economy, agents often have an opportunity to withdraw at
basically no costs, e.g. every time they ﬁnd a withdrawal point next to the shopping
point.
The diﬀusion of ATMs on the territory provides one example of a ﬁnancial de-
velopment which has signiﬁcantly aﬀected the frequency of low-cost withdrawals.
Evidence on the increasing importance of the ATM as withdrawal devices is pro-
vided in Table 1. During the nineties both the territorial diﬀusion of ATMs and the
fraction of the population who possesses an ATM card have increased signiﬁcantly
(respectively from 221 to 649 ATM points per million residents and from 15 to 55
10per cent).
Altogether, we want to ask whether explicitly accounting for the fact that the cost
of withdrawal might change according to speciﬁc situations can help in interpreting
the evidence presented above.
4.1 A search model of the demand for currency
Consider an agent who, in each period, ﬁnances an exogenous stream of consumption
expenditures equal to c (time is discrete and the agent has an inﬁnite horizon). The
agent needs cash to buy goods (i.e. we rule out credit goods). Shopping takes place
in one of several locations of this economy, which are may or may not be endowed
with a cash dispenser.
Our model captures the existence of both costly and non-costly withdrawals by
assuming that if the agent happens to be shopping at a location that has a cash
dispenser (think of it as either an ATM or a bank branch), then a withdrawal
can take place at no extra cost. When the agent ends up shopping in a location
without cash dispenser, a withdrawal requires her to waste time searching for a cash
dispenser, this entails a non monetary cost equal to b (this withdrawal technology is
completely analoguos to the one in the inventory model of Section 3). We measure
the diﬀusion of the costly withdrawal technology by the probability (1¡p) that the
agent ends up shopping in a location without a cash dispenser.
When every shopping point is endowed with a cash dispenser (p = 1), the shopper
can reduce cash holdings to zero. However, as long as the probability p is less than
one, the optimal quantity of currency demanded by the agent will be greater than
zero. This quantity weights the costs of forgone interest on deposit (Rm, where R
denotes the net interest rate) against the (expected) costs of ending up without cash
at a shopping location, in which case the agent must search for a dispenser and bear
the non-monetary cost b.
The sequence of events in a typical period of this economy is depicted in Figure
1. The agent goes shopping carrying mt¡1 currency from the previous period. With
probability p, the agent ends up shopping in a location which has a cash dispenser.
At this point (node A in the ﬁgure), the agent makes a withdrawal wt; she then
consumes c and leaves the period with mt = mt¡1+wt¡c currency. With probability
(1¡p), the agent ends up in a location without cash dispenser (node B in the ﬁgure).
She may decide to search for it (bearing the non-monetary cost b) , withdraw wt
and consume c (node B0 in Figure 1). Or she may decide not to search and pay for
current consumption using the available currency holdings. In this case the end of
period currency is mt = mt¡1 ¡ c (node B1 in Figure 1).
Formally, the agent’s problem can be written recursively as follows. Let VA(m)
be the expected cost of ﬁnancing the consumption ﬂow for an agent who holds an
amount m ¸ 0 of currency and is matched with a cash dispenser. Let VB(m) be
the corresponding expected cost for an agent who is unmatched. The value function
VA(m) is given by :






Enter period with mt¡1 in pocket
Meet a cash
dispenser (p)
Do not meet a cash
dispenser (1 ¡ p)
Walk to the cash
dispenser




² Leave period with:
mt = mt¡1 + wt ¡ c
² Bear the (non-monetary) cost b
² Withdraw wt
² Purchase c
² Leave period with:
mt = mt¡1 + wt ¡ c
² Purchase c
² Leave period with:
mt = mt¡1 ¡ c
VA(m) = min
w
fR(m + w) + ±[pVA(m + w ¡ c) + (1 ¡ p)VB(m + w ¡ c)]g (4)
subject to m+w ¸ c. The Bellman equation states that the optimal currency choice
weights the current costs of a greater foregone interest with the future (± denotes
the discount factor) expected costs implied by the current withdrawal. For an agent
who is not matched with the ATM :
VB(m) =
½
minfb + VA(m);Rm + ±[pVA(m ¡ c) + (1 ¡ p)VB(m ¡ c)]g
b + VA(m)
for m ¸ c
otherwise
(5)
where the second line indicates that the agent must search for a cash dispenser and
bear the cost b whenever currency holdings are not suﬃcient to pay for the current
period consumption.
The policy function for this problem w(s;m) is a map that, given the state of
the world (s = A or s = B) and the amount of money in hand, prescribes the agent
whether and how much to withdraw.






m¤ ¡ m if s = A
0 if s = B and m ¸ c
m¤ ¡ m if s = B and m < c
(6)




fRz + ± (1 ¡ p)VB (z ¡ c)g
Note that:
VA =
Rm¤ + ± (1 ¡ p)VB (m¤ ¡ c)
1 ¡ ±p
solves the Bellman equation (4). Hence the value function VA is constant and the
optimal withdrawal for the agent matched with a cash dispenser is w¤ = m¤ ¡ m.
Deﬁne the function f(m) ´ R(m)+±[pVA +(1¡p)VB(m¡c)], over the domain
m = nc with n = 1;2;3;:::::.
Note from (4) that VA = minm f(m) = f(m¤), which implies that VB ¸ VA. The
integer value n¤ ´ m¤
c corresponds to the number of consumption periods ﬁnanced
by the optimal withdrawal.
Assume (which we verify below) that VB(nc) = f(nc) for 1 · n · n¤. By
recursive substitution into 5 we can express the value of VB as a function of the











This shows that VB(nc) is a convex function of n, hence that it is decreasing for
1 · n · n¤, i.e. over the [c; m¤] range. Hence, if it is not optimal to walk to the
dispenser when m = c, it is never optimal to walk to a dispenser for m · m¤.
The proof is completed by verifying that it is not optimal to walk to a cash
dispenser when m = c. Compare the cost of walking to a dispenser (b+Rm¤+±[pVA+
(1¡p)VB(m¤¡c)]) with the cost of not walking: (b+Rc+±[pVA+(1¡p)(VA+b)]).
Some algebra shows that the diﬀerence between these two is always greater than zero.
Therefore, an agent at node B only chooses to withdraw when her cash balances are
insuﬃcient to ﬁnance the current consumption.
The above result shows that there is an optimal level of currency balances, m¤,
which is the same for all agents who decide to withdraw, irrespective of current
holdings. We can then deﬁne the integer value n¤ ´ m¤
c which corresponds to the
number of consumption periods ﬁnanced by the optimal withdrawal.
The policy rule thus prescribes the following: replenish currency balances till
the target level m¤ whenever a cash dispenser is available. Otherwise, the rule
prescribes not to walk to a dispenser, provided currency holdings are suﬃcient to
ﬁnance consumption. The only instance in which the ﬁxed cost b is paid is when
13the agent is not matched with a dispenser and currency holdings are insuﬃcient to
pay for consumption.13
4.2 The demand for currency and interest elasticity
The model shows that the typical agent in this economy will be holding diﬀerent
amount of currency in diﬀerent period, depending on whether she was matched with
cash a dispenser this period, one period ago, and so on. The model thus generates
a whole distribution for currency holdings.
Computing this distribution is necessary to study how the average currency
holdings of a representative agent respond to changes in the nominal rate of interest
and to the diﬀusion of cash dispensers (as measured by the probability p). Let the
function Θ(m) denote the density of the end-of-period currency balances m.
Only a fraction ¼ of agents replenish their balances in each period: after con-
suming they are left with currency holdings equal to m¤ ¡ c. The fraction ¼ in-
cludes p individuals who are matched with a cash-dispenser (node A in Figure
1) and (1 ¡ p)
n¤
¼ agents who pay the cost b and undertake a costly withdrawal.
The latter group is given by those agents who remain unmatched with a dispenser
for n¤ consecutive periods (node B0 in Figure 1). The value for ¼ thus satisﬁes:
¼ = p + (1 ¡ p)
n¤
¼, which yields ¼ =
p
1¡(1¡p)n¤:
Table 7: Currency holdings distribution
End of period currency (mi) 0 c ::: (n¤ ¡ ·)c ::: (n¤ ¡ 1)c
Withdrawal (wi) m¤ m¤ ¡ c ::: ·c ::: c
Population Fraction Θ(mi) (1 ¡ p)
n
¤¡1 ¼ (1 ¡ p)
n
¤¡2 ¼ ::: (1 ¡ p)
·¡1 ¼ ::: ¼
Similarly, one can compute the fraction of agents with end-of-period balances
equal to zero, Θ(0). This is given by those agents who, after a withdrawal, remain
un-matched with a cash dispenser for n¤ ¡ 1 periods (hence Θ(0) = (1 ¡ p)
n¤¡1 ¼).
Following this line of reasoning, we compute the population fraction of agents with
end-of-period balances equal to m¤ ¡·c (where · = 1;2;3;::::n¤), which is given by
Θ(m¤¡·c) = (1 ¡ p)
·¡1 ¼: Table 7 summarizes the distribution of currency holdings
in this economy.
A few numeric examples are used to illustrate the workings of the model for
three alternative levels of the probability of a cheap withdrawal p.14 The basic
parametrization assumes the unit length of a period is a day, a daily consumption
ﬂow c = 1 and that the utility loss of a costly withdrawal is b = 1=24, i.e. about the
value of one hour of time. We consider values of the nominal interest rate between
13Intuitively, for an agent at node B with m ¸ c it is not optimal to walk to the dispenser, since
this choice entails paying the ﬁxed cost b with certainty while the choice of not walking to the
dispenser allows her to postpone paying this cost.
14Alvarez and Lippi (2004) provide an analytical characterization of these results.
14Figure 2: Currency distribution for diﬀerent values of p when R = 0:10






























 p = 0.00 
 p = 0.40 
 p = 0.80 
0.5 and 20 per cent and an intertemporal discount rate ± = 0:96 (both variables are
expressed in annual rates).
The three distributions of currency holdings originated by this parametrization
are shown in Figure 2 for a given net nominal annual interest rate of 10 per cent
(R = 0:1). When all withdrawals are costly (p = 0), the distribution of currency is
uniform (the blue bars in the ﬁgure), as in the Baumol-Tobin case. As the probability
of free withdrawals becomes positive, the distribution becomes unimodal, with the
largest mass of agents located at the maximum currency holdings (m¤ ¡c), and the
remaining mass distributed to the left of this value in a decreasing fashion. It is also
apparent that the size of the optimal balance m¤ is decreasing in p, as one could
intuitively expect. This reﬂects the fact that the demand for currency in this model
has a precautionary component. The reason that motivates an agent to withdraw
more currency than what is strictly necessary to pay for today’s consumption is
to reduce the chances of having to pay the cost b at some point in the future. A
greater value of p, by reducing the odds of incurring in a costly withdrawal, reduces
the agent’s desired currency holdings.
The average currency balance held by each agent in this economy can be readily
calculated as:
¯ m = Σi [mi ¢ Θ(mi)] (7)
Figure 3 depicts three schedules of the demand for currency corresponding to
each of the p values (low, medium, high) described above. Each curve describes the
average currency balance of an agent as a function of the nominal interest rate on
15deposits, R. For low values of p, the curve is downward sloping, with an interest
elasticity that is approximately constant at around 0.5. The ﬁgure clearly shows
that, as the probability of a costly withdrawal decreases, the interest elasticity of the
demand for currency gets smaller. The model thus reproduces a qualitative feature
of the data, namely that the interest rate elasticity of the demand for currency may
decrease with time as the diﬀusion of ATM machines and bank branches allows the
agents to avoid the costly withdrawals implied by the inventory model.
Figure 3: Currency Demand for diﬀerent values of p
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Finally, the model can be used to provide a partial equilibrium assessment of
the welfare costs of inﬂation. The natural measure of welfare costs of our model is,
analogously to the Baumol-Tobin approach, the deadweight loss associated to the
costly withdrawal: b. The per-period welfare loss can thus be calculated from the
proportion of individuals who bear the cost b on average in each period:15
l = b(1 ¡ p)
n¤
¼ (8)
Figure 4 shows three proﬁles for welfare losses as a function of the net nominal
interest rate R corresponding to the three levels of p considered above. When all
withdrawals are costly (p = 0), the welfare loss is steeply increasing in R. The loss
associated with a nominal interest of 5 per cent has a magnitude of about 5 per
cent of consumption, quite a large number. The ﬁgure shows that the welfare costs
of inﬂation (i.e. nominal interest rate) decrease sharply as the cheap withdrawal
15This value can also be interpreted as the expected welfare loss for an individual who lives in
this economy.
16technology becomes widely available (greater p). The welfare costs of a 5 per cent
nominal interest rate when p = 0:8 is about 0.1 per cent of consumption.
Finally it is important to notice that in our model the welfare gain achievable
from a reduction in inﬂation crucially depends on the parameter p. In particular, in
a regime characterized by a low level of p (the dotted line of Figure 4), the reduction
in the welfare loss resulting from a fall in inﬂation is sistematically larger than that
obtained in a regime characterized by an higher level of p (e.g. the solid line of
Figure 4).
Figure 4: Welfare Losses for diﬀerent values of p
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This section draws from Attanasio et al. (2002). Information on sample design
and response rates of the Survey of Household Income and Wealth can be found in
Brandolini and Cannari (1994). In the empirical estimates, all demographic variables
are referred to the head of the household. All monetary variables are deﬂated using
the consumer price index, expressed in 1995 lire and then converted to euros.
ATM ownership. In each year, respondents report ownership of an ATM card.
The surveys also contain information about the use of ATMs. In practice, virtually
all those reporting having an ATM card also report using the ATM card.
Currency. The following question was asked to household heads in each of the
surveys: What is the average amount of currency usually held in your family?
Minimum amount of currency. The following question was asked to household
heads in each of the surveys: Usually, what is the amount of currency that you have
at home before you choose to make a currency withdrawal?
Number of withdrawals and average withdrawal. The following questions were
asked to household heads in each of the surveys: Think about a normal month.
How many currency withdrawals are made by you or members of your household?
What is the average currency withdrawn? These questions are asked separately for
withdrawals at a bank or a post oﬃce, and at an ATM point.
Consumption. Consumption is the sum of the expenditure on food consumption,
entertainment, education, clothes, medical expenses, housing repairs and additions,
and imputed rents. Expenditures on durable goods (vehicles, furniture and appli-
ances, or art objects) are therefore not included in the deﬁnition of consumption.
Deposits. Include checking accounts, savings accounts, and postal deposits.
Education of the household head. This variable is originally coded as follows:
no education (zero), completed elementary school (ﬁve years), completed junior
high school (eight years), completed high school (13 years), completed college (18
years), and graduate education (more than 20 years). The variables actually used
in regression are dummies for each of the classes described above.
Financial wealth. Sum of checking accounts, savings accounts, postal deposits,
government paper, corporate bonds, mutual funds and other managed accounts, and
stocks. Data have been corrected to guarantee comparability across time.
Interest rate on deposits. We have data on the average nominal interest rate
on checking accounts by year (1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002) and
provinces (95 up to 1995 and 103 afterwards). The source is the Central Credit
Register. This data set is then merged with the 1989-02 SHIW.
Number of ATM points per province. Data on the number of ATM points in each
year/province are provided by the Supervisory Reports to the Bank of Italy. This
data set is then merged with the 1989-02 SHIW.
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